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HERE, THERE AND EVERYWHERE: MOBILITY
DATA IN THE EU (HELP NEEDED: WHERE IS
PRIVACY?)
Raffaele Zallone†
Abstract
European law on data privacy has not clearly developed the
concept of mobility data. The evolution of technology has forced the
EU to cope with this reality, but so far its legislation lacks a specific
focus on this aspect of technology.
A body composed of representatives from the various data
protection authorities, the so-called article 29 Working Party (the
name stems from section 29 of the European Data Privacy Directive,
that calls for the formation and the task of this body) has coped with
various aspects of mobile technology, but the documents and analysis
it has produced are general and un-conclusive. This is reflected in
the general attitude on the side of industry, which seems to be more
concentrated on getting access to as many data as possible, rather
than taking European data privacy laws seriously.
The European Commission has published its new proposed
Regulation that, in the Commission’s plans, are bound to replace the
old Data Privacy Directive. The proposed Regulation, again, lacks a
definition of mobility data, but its present wording is something the
industry should look at very seriously, since lack of compliance with it
(assuming it shall be enforced sometime in the not-so-far future) may
be extremely costly.

† Raffaele Zallone is the founding and managing partner of Studio Legale Zallone, a
highly specialized firm in the IT business based in Milano. He was General Counsel for IBM
Italy from 1989 until 1997, when he started his law firm. Mr. Zallone has been a professor of IT
Law at the Bocconi University in Milano and Chairman of the ITC Committee of the European
Lawyers Association (UAE). He is the author of several books on IT contracts, privacy and
internet. Mr. Zallone and his firm focus on drafting and negotiating outsourcing contracts,
intellectual property issues, e-commerce, and data privacy matters.
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INTRODUCTION
From the very moment of its foundation, the European Union
(EU) has tried in every way to eliminate any obstacles to the free
circulation of goods, services and people across borders. In fact, the
EU is based on what have been defined as the four basic European
freedoms; these basic freedoms are: free circulation of goods, free
circulation of capital, free circulation of services, and (last, but
certainly not the least important) free circulation of people.1 The
elimination of any kind of barriers and the possibility for people to
offer their services and goods regardless of their place of origin has
been the driving force of the European Commission from the outset.
In essence, mobility is at the very heart of Europe; in order to foster
growth and freedom, everyone and everything has to be free to move,
work, and live wherever they see fit—people have to be able to move
freely, and so do goods, services, etc.
Needless to say that whenever people move, their data move
along with them. If a European citizen wants to move and work in
any country within the EU, his or her data must follow him or her
from the country of origin to the country of destination; therefore,
making sure mobility is not restrained has always been a top priority
for European legislators.
It is for these reasons that the concept of mobility is clearly
present and expressly mentioned in the title of the basic and
fundamental law of Europe on data protection (the “Data Protection
Directive”), which is set to regulate “the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.”2
It is fair to say that even though the mobility of data was
conceived as a requisite at the outset of European legislation on data
protection, European legislators could not have known how important
mobility would become for data protection law, and most of all, how
different the concept of data mobility would be from what it was
originally foreseen to be in 1995. For the sake of time, I shall not
spend time describing the changes, the improvements, and the
different progresses of technology that have increased the amount of
mobility data available nowadays; we all know the technology, we all
1. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
3.1, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173.
2. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 29-30, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
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use it and we all have it in front of our eyes. I would rather start with
examining the different aspects of mobility that are relevant to data
protection law and how European legislators have dealt with it.
I.

WHAT PERSONAL DATA ARE MOBILITY DATA?
A. A Possible Definition

When addressing the issues raised by mobility data we need to
ask ourselves whether there is a definition of mobility data under
European Law that we can use as a reference. The answer is no—as
of today, European Law (and, to the best of my knowledge, any data
protection law of any other country) has no definition of mobility
data. The closest one gets is European Directive 2002/58/EC, in
which Article 2(c) defines “location data” as “any data processed in
an electronic communication network indicating the geographic
position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available
electronic communications services.”3
This definition makes no reference to mobility. Eventually
location data will turn out to be mobility data (if one knows the
location of a data subject in any given moment and assuming in time
the data subject has changed his or her location). This definition is
based on a static concept related to an object (the physical location of
a terminal device), while mobility data, for the purpose of the analysis
I shall carry out in this paper, are something very different.
Importantly, the European Commission has issued the draft of a
new Regulation, which shall replace the present data protection
directive (Directive 95/46/EC). The present draft of the new
Regulation (at least in its present status) gives no definition of
mobility data.4
Because of a lack of a statutory definition and for the sake of
common understanding, I shall refer to “mobility data” as personal
data which indicate the physical places (and hence the movements)
where a person has been in time and where personal data have been
generated.

3. Council Directive 2002/58, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 43 (EC).
4. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Draft
Proposal],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
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B. The Traditional Notion of Mobility Data
Using this definition, we can now examine the different kinds of
mobility data. First, we have the data derived from the physical
movement of the data subject, i.e. the person whose data are being
processed. As an example, when one person travels or simply moves
in different places of the same geographical area, the data derived
from the use of his or her credit card shall show charges related to the
purchases made in the various places visited. The fact that charges
have been generated in location A and in location B show that the
data subject has moved from location A to location B. Another
example is the passengers’ data processed by an airline—to board a
plane, one must go through the check-in procedures. These data show
that passengers of any given flight were in city A before take-off and
(most likely) will be in city B after landing. In this case mobility data
are not self-generated by technological devices, but are simply the
result of the use of information technology (IT) to perform basic
processing related to the business activity of the controller. What has
generated the data is just the physical presence of a person in different
places in different times.
Another kind of mobility data are data which are generated by a
device that is associated to a person. Radio frequency identification
devices (RFIDs) are a typical example of these devices;5 they also are
the first example of self-generated data that have been examined
under EU law (as we shall see later on in this paper). RFID6 is the
technology that allows one to pay the toll automatically on a freeway
or when crossing a bridge without stopping at the pay-toll gate, or that
allows employees to access different areas of an office and to open
doors with a badge. In all these cases RFIDs are associated with a
person; therefore, the data generated from the device indicate the
presence of a person in a given place at a given time.
Global Positioning System (GPS)7 data are other examples of

5. For a summary description of RFID technology see Simon Holloway, RFID: An
Introduction, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK (June 2006), http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/aa479355.aspx.
6. For more on RFID technology see Roy Want, An Introduction to RFID Technology,
IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2006, at 25; see also LARAN RFID, A BASIC
INTRODUCTION TO RFID TECHNOLOGY AND ITS USE IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN (2005) (on file with
author).
7. GPS provides location information on objects on the earth. GPS Definition,
BRITANNICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/235395/GPS (last visited Nov.
1, 2013). The system is composed of a number of satellites and on ground receivers. Id. A
GPS receiver calculates its position by precisely timing the signals sent by a satellite. Id.
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this kind of mobility data. A GPS8 is, in essence, a satellite-based
system that tracks the position and the movements of a given object,
be it a car or a mobile phone. In fact, GPS is a basic feature of many
mobile phones, in that it allows location of the phone and the cell
tower to which it is connected. When the telephone moves along with
its owner, the GPS constantly indicates its location and allows one to
make/receive phone calls, mail, or messages in any place. GPS is
also a basic feature of some (but, probably of all smartphone
embedded) digital cameras.9 It is now customary on the computer,
when downloading pictures taken with a phone, to see the different
places where every single picture was taken.10 This feature was used
by the FBI to track and arrest a hacker of the “Anonymous” group
who had just cracked a strategic military IT system. In order to show
off his success in cracking the system, the hacker had taken a picture
of the screen and published it, which was enough to locate and arrest
him!11
Most apps available for download and use on our smartphones
use location data, for one reason or another.12 Some applications
could not work at all without being able to position the user—for
example, one of the main purposes of Google’s Maps13 would be
totally useless if it wasn’t able to exactly locate the user requesting
data. It is hard to conceive how it would be possible for it to indicate

8. For more information on GPS technology see Official U.S. Government Information
About Global Positioning System (GPS) and Related Topics, http://www.gps.gov (last visited
Aug. 24, 2013).
9. A feature called “geo-tagging” applies location coordinates to digital objects like
photographs and other documents for purposes such as creating map overlays. See Geotag
Definition,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/geotag (last visited Nov. 1,
2013).
10. Apple’s iPhoto under the heading “Places” will show all the locations where the
photos loaded on the Mac have been taken, a common feature now in many programs.
11. Photographic geo-coding combines position data with photographs taken with a
digital camera, which allows one to look up the location where the photograph was taken. See
Diomidis D. Spinellis, Position-Annotated Photographs: A Geotemporal Web, IEEE PERVASIVE
COMPUTING, Apr.–June 2003, at 72, available at http://www.spinellis.gr/pubs/jrnl/2003-PCGTWeb/html/gtweb.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
12. The information usually available on Apple’s iTunes Store is a brief description of
the App, the name of the developer, the category it fits in, the date of the latest update and the
version, dimension of memory required, compatibility and an evaluation based on feedback
from users. APPLE ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/charts/free-apps/ (last visited Dec. 16,
2013). No detailed technical information is usually available; in some cases, where a link with
the developer is supplied, some more technical information is available.
13. GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.it/maps?hl=it&tab=nl (last visited Aug. 24,
2013).
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the road to follow in order to get from a given place of origin to a
required destination without knowing the location of the user and his
or her movement in space and time. The processing of mobility data
generated from our mobile devices (phones, tablets, etc.) is the one
thing data protection authorities are presently struggling with most.
They haven’t come to any solution or proposal; in fact, I know of only
one decision related to mobility data in any part of Europe so far, and
it is a fairly recent development in the Netherlands. It is a decision
against Tom-Tom, a fairly common navigation system used in many
cars, that was laid down in December 2011 by the CBP, the Dutch
Data Protection Authority, which this Article shall analyze later on.14
Again, if we stick to the definition given at the outset of this
section, we can make dozens of examples of data that indicate the
mobility of persons. However, this definition is not and cannot be
exhaustive. The point is that, for all practical purposes, the
assumption that mobility data only refer to the mobility of the data
subject is fairly conservative since it only considers the physical
movement in space of a person or of a device, and it reflects our
natural attitude to consider things for their physical characteristics and
dimension. Since we live in a three-dimensional world, we consider
only the variations of mass that can be noticed in space and time, that
are derived from movement of people and devices in space and
time—in essence, we stick to what we can see with our eyes (or what
can be seen by someone else’s eyes).
C. A New Paradigm for Mobility Data
This is a limited way of addressing the issue and so I would like
to make the point that technology has put in front of our eyes at least
two additional cases to consider: cloud computing15 and internet
navigation data.
So far lawyers have examined the legal implications of cloud
computing from many points of view. Right now, for example, many
are asking the following question: is there a limitation to the kind of
data that can be put into the cloud? Can a government organization
14. COLL. BESCHERMING PERSOONSGEGEVENS, OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE CBP
INTO THE PROCESSING OF GEO-LOCATION DATA BY TOM TOM N.V. (2011), available at
http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_overig/en_pb_20120112_investigation-tomtom.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 29, 2013).
15. Cloud Computing allows the use of computing resources, on demand, through a
network (usually through the Internet). Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 2-3 (Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech.
ed., 2011).
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use cloud computing in regards to data used to perform the tasks and
the activities of public administrations, e.g. data related to the health
of its citizens, their financial situation as reflected in their tax returns,
data that indicate racial origin and the like? Can a government
organization use it for any other kind of data? Public agencies and
public administrations are examining what data can be processed
using the cloud technologies and offerings that are now available
everywhere and from many providers.16
For what reasons are public authorities interested in examining
cloud computing? It is because it is not the data subject that moves in
cloud computing technology, rather it is the data that moves! Cloud
computing techniques and technologies require data to move
dynamically from one server to another, on the basis of the services
requested and the availability of storage and/or computing power. In
fact, data processed with cloud computing techniques can be stored
and/or processed in any given device of an IT infrastructure,
regardless of the country that originated the data or where the final
customer resides.17 When the data are required for processing, they
may then be moved to any device on the basis of available resources
and/or computing power, thus allowing the provider to respond to
every specific customer’s demand. The servers or the storage devices
where the data are moved may be in any given country of the world.
The physical location and its nationality, in this technology, is not an
issue, rather the issue is to better exploit the technology to better
service customers. In our world of cut-throat competition, where
industries try to save every possible nickel and dime, servers tend to
be located in areas where manpower costs are lower. We have seen
the rise in outsourcing capabilities in India and other similar
countries; the same is true for cloud computing. In fact, with increase

16. Most recently the Swiss government has issued a bid through the University of
Lausanne to ascertain what data held by a Swiss public administration could be stored or
processed on cloud computing systems. For additional materials and information on cloud
computing and privacy implications, see DIDIER BIGO, ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, POLICY
DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, FIGHTING CYBER CRIME
AND
PROTECTING
PRIVACY
IN
THE
CLOUD
(2012),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&f
ile=79050 (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
17. Indeed, this is the main difference between cloud computing and the traditional
client-server model. Cloud computing resources are shared by multiple users because the
technology allows the users to maximize their resources by allocating them to users in different
time-zones. Thus, for instance, during European business hours a given set of resources serve
European customers, while the same resources serve North American customers during their
business hours.
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in competition and with new entrants on the marketplace, pricesensitivity shall increase and the likelihood that servers be placed in
remote countries with low manpower costs is going to increase
accordingly. This is not a trivial fact—data from rich and wealthy
countries may end up in the hands of low-income, less developed
countries. This may not be a problem in and of itself, but the issues
related to it need to be addressed and resolved from a legal
perspective.18
But let’s go back to mobility; in cloud computing there are no
mobility data as I have tried to define them at the outset. The issue is
mobility of the data.
The point is that moving data from one country to another is an
act that has significant legal consequences,19 since trans-border data
flow (when data moves beyond the boundaries of Europe) is regulated
(at least in Europe) and has to follow certain rules.20 Therefore,
regardless of where the data are generated, the fact that they may be
moved from one country to another does create a data protection issue
to be addressed and resolved. What makes the case of cloud
computing difficult to address is that the mobility of the data does
depend on the basic operational decision and choices of the supplier
of could computing services. The location of data and their
movement within the supplier’s infrastructure is mostly automatically
driven by the software, and is independent from the location of the
customer as well as of the location of the data subject. It is probably
correct to say that if the question was asked to most suppliers of cloud
computing services, “Where are my data today?” very few would be
in a position to answer that question quickly and correctly.
Another case to address is internet navigation data. Again, as
stated above, I appreciate that we all have a view of the world which
is functional to the physical side of our life: things move in space; our
bodies are physical objects that move in space; in this very moment, I
am writing this paper by hitting the keys disposed in the layout of the
keyboard. This is simply to say that our minds conceive movement as

18. For the legal issues raised by cloud computing, see W. Kuan Hon, Christopher
Millard & Ian Walden, Negotiating Cloud Contracts: Looking at Clouds From Both Sides Now,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 79 (2012).
19. Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 25-26, at 45-46.
20. A standard contract has been developed to be used when transferring data outside the
EU; this contract has been recently updated with the Commission decision of February 5, 2010.
Commission Decision 2010/87 of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5.
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a physical act of an object in space. When we surf the web from one
site to another in search of information, we are not moving—our
bodies remain in the same physical place (at our desk or in front of
our tablet). But while we sit and wait for the results of our
navigation, the bits generated from our searches migrate from one
device to another; electrical impulses hit different devices, bits are
arranged in different fashion, and so our data move from one site to
another one, with the final aim to give the users the data sought.
Let me be clear: it is not the fact that bits and electrical impulses
move from one device to another inside computers that makes the
difference—bits, data, and impulses move continuously when we use
a computer. The point is that when moving from one site to the next,
our data move from one server to another one, thus creating new sets
of data (navigation data) that for all practical purposes can be
regarded as personal data (remember, the Data Protection Directive
defines personal data as “any information related to an identified or
identifiable natural person; an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to a
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity”).21 In their trip to retrieve the data and the information we
were seeking from the destination internet site, our data have moved
from one server to another, creating a completely new set of personal
data. Once again, in the case of internet navigation data, as in the
case of cloud computing, we have mobility of the data as opposed to
mobility of the data subject.
The last two examples show that we are facing new and different
paradigms where the mobility focus is not on the data subject but on
the data itself. After all, the law protects personal data—if mobility
of the personal data is induced by reasons different from the
movement of the data subject, it’s still mobility and it’s still data. For
this reason navigation data, in my view, do fit within a possible
definition of mobility data, upon the condition that we amend the
initial definition to include the categories of data indicated above: (A)
personal data which indicate the movements and the physical places
where a person has been in time and where personal data have been
generated; and (B) personal data which indicate Internet navigation of
a data subject; and (C) personal data moved, stored, or processed
from time to time in different locations.

21.

Council Directive, supra note 2, art. 2, at 38.
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II. MOBILITY DATA AND THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
Having set the stage in this way, what are the issues related to
mobility data under European law?
In order to answer this question, the basic principles of data
protection have to be recalled, i.e. what the Data Protection Directive
defines as the data protection principles.22 In essence, these principles
are the following:23
1. personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully;
2. personal data can be held for one or more specified lawful
purposes and shall not be further processed in any manner
incompatible with such purposes;
3. personal data shall be adequate and relevant and not excessive
in relation to such purposes;
4. personal data shall be accurate and kept up-to-date;
5. personal data shall be kept for no longer than is necessary for
such purposes;
6. personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of
the data subjects;
7. adequate security measures have to be taken to protect personal
data;
8. personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory
outside the EU unless that country or territory ensures an
adequate level of protection for the rights and freedom of data
24
subjects.

Let’s say that, for the purposes of this paper, the most relevant
data principles are (A) the transparency principle (point 2): if anyone
wants to process personal data, they have to state for which purposes
they are going to be processes; (B) the purpose principle (point 2):
personal data have to be processed for one or more specific and
identified purposes; (C) the data quality principle (point 3): data must
be “adequate and relevant,” i.e. one has to process data that are
consistent with the purposes of the processing; and (D) the location
principle (point 8): data can flow freely within the EU, but if they
have to go outside the EU it must be into a country where there is a

22. Id. arts. 5-6, at 39-40.
23. Id. art. 6, at 40.
24. Id. Most European statutes on data protection have the same data principles. See e.g.
Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 4, sch. 1 (Eng.); see also Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno
2003, in D.Lgs., n. 196 (It.).
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reasonable expectation that the data shall receive an adequate level of
protection, comparable to the protection they receive within the EU.25
This means that any entity processing mobility data must inform the
data subject about two things: that the entity processes personal data
of the data subject and for what purposes the entity is processing the
data. The data subject, depending on the circumstances (and on the
law they are subject to) has to agree with such processing.
There is no legal requirement under EU law to indicate what data
shall be processed; therefore, it is irrelevant to indicate if one shall
collect and process mobility data. Nevertheless, since the relevance
of data is one of the data protection principles, one must ensure that
there is a fair and lawful reason to collect mobility data. A phone
company needs mobility data to provide its services and connect the
customers wherever he or she may be. In this case the processing is
consistent with the scope of providing the services agreed upon and
fulfilling the contract between the parties.
On the other hand, an application called “Mirror,”26 which
simply transforms the screen of a smartphone into a mirror (sort of),
sends a warning stating: “Mirror wants to access your location data”
(which means that as one moves, the app shall be collecting mobility
data). Under the data quality principle above, what is the relevance of
mobility data to an application that is only supposed to transform my
screen into a mirror? What is the purpose of such processing and how
does it relate to the function performed by the application?
The fact is that nowadays, it is quite common to open an app and
receive the message, “This app wants to use your location data.” This
means that the app, no matter what its purpose is and what function it
is supposed to perform, shall collect mobility data of the data subject.
Under the data protection principles highlighted above and European
law, one has to ascertain the relevance of mobility data for such an
application. The question is not moot, because if the location data are
not necessary and consistent with the purpose principle and/or the
data quality principle, i.e. the data are not necessary to perform the
function that the app is supposed to perform, collecting and
processing these data could be against EU law. Checking the
processing of mobility data against the data principles, in the light of
the function performed by an app, is fundamental to position it under
EU Law and to decide how to proceed, whether or not consent of the
25.
26.
2013).

Council Directive, supra note 2, arts. 25-26, at 45-46.
ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mirror/id390949350 (last visited Aug. 25,
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data subject is needed.27
III. MOBILITY DATA IN THE EU
Mobility data has been examined by several EU authorities.
Article 29 of the European Data Privacy Directive has established a
Working Group, known as the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party (WP29);28 it is composed of representatives of the national Data
Protection Authorities. The WP29 has a consulting function, not a
legislative or a judiciary function; however, it exercises a significant
role in data protection in Europe, because its document highlights the
common position of the various authorities established in every
member state. In 2005 the WP29 published four documents that deal
with mobility data. The first one on RFIDs (WP 105)29 was followed
by a public consultation on the subject and resulted in a second

27. Case law shows several cases where the processing was blocked because the data
sought was totally unrelated to the purpose that apparently being pursued. The website of the
Italian Authority has almost ten pages of decisions and documents on the matter; for example, a
company that supplies business information through a central database of all companies, as well
as on individuals, was required to eliminate certain records from its files, since they were not
considered pertinent under the law.
For more information, see GARANTE,
www.garanteprivacy.it (search “pertinenza”) (last visited Aug. 25, 2013).
28. The directive provides as follows:
(1) A Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Working Party’, is
hereby set up. It shall have advisory status and act independently. (2) The
Working Party shall be composed of a representative of the supervisory authority
or authorities designated by each Member State and of a representative of the
authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and bodies,
and of a representative of the Commission. Each member of the Working Party
shall be designated by the institution, authority or authorities which he represents.
Where a Member State has designated more than one supervisory authority, they
shall nominate a joint representative. The same shall apply to the authorities
established for Community institutions and bodies. (3) The Working Party shall
take decisions by a simple majority of the representatives of the supervisory
authorities. (4) The Working Party shall elect its chairman. The chairman’s term
of office shall be two years. His appointment shall be renewable. (5) The
Working Party’s secretariat shall be provided by the Commission. (6) The
Working Party shall adopt its own rules of procedure. (7) The Working Party
shall consider items placed on its agenda by its chairman, either on his own
initiative or at the request of a representative of the supervisory authorities or at
the Commission’s request.
Council Directive, supra note 2, arts. 29-30.
29. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Working Document on Data Protection
Issues Related to RFID Technology, 2005 10107/05 (WP 105) (EN), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf (last visited Aug.
25, 2013).
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document (WP 111).30 The third document (WP 115) deals with the
use of location data in the context of supplying value added
services.31 The most recent document was adopted on February 27,
2013 (WP 202).32
WP 105 highlighted a heated debate between industry
representatives, consumer groups, universities, think tanks, and trade
organizations. WP 105 set out some examples of processing personal
data using RFIDs, for example a supermarket that tags loyalty cards
or similar devices (which identify the holder by name) to learn
consumer habits while in the store.33 Another example made by the
WP29 was related to products which have been tagged with RFIDs—
a customer enters a shop wearing a product (a wrist watch) bearing an
RFID, albeit not originally inserted by that shop; the customer’s RFID
is scanned by the reading station of the shop which starts a profile of
the customer so that when he or she returns to the store he or she is
identified and the profile is updated with details of sections visited,
products bought, etc. Even though the store may not know the
customer’s name (since the RFID was inserted in the wrist watch by
someone else) the WP29 believed these were personal data.34 These
examples have been strongly criticized by industry representatives,
30. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Results of the Public Consultation on
Article 29 Working Document 105 on Data Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology, 2005
1670/05
(WP
111)
(EN),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp111_en.pdf (last visited Aug.
25, 2013).
31. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Party 29 Opinion on the Use of
Location Data with a View to Providing Value-Added Services, 2005 2130/05 (WP 115) (EN),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp115_en.pdf (last
visited Aug. 25, 2013).
32. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on Apps on Smart
Devices, 2013 00461/13 (WP 202) (EN), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2013).
33. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 29, at 5-6 (“one can consider
the case where supermarket tags loyalty cards or similar devices, which identify individuals by
their name to learn and record consumer habits while consumers are in the store”).
34. The WP29 explained:
Take the hypothesis when person Z walks into shop C with a bag of RFID-tagged
products from shops A and B. Shop C scans his bags and the products in it are
revealed. Shop C keeps a record of the numbers. When person Z returns to the
shop the next day, he is rescanned. Product Y that was scanned yesterday is
revealed today; the number is for the watch he always wears. Shop C sets up a
file using the number of product Y as a key. This allows them to track when
person Z enters the shop, using the RFID number of his watch as a reference
number for him.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 29, at 7.
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who, in response to the public consultation, made the point that these
were not to be considered personal data. The WP29 did not issue a
decision on the matter (since it has no decision power) but reported
the dissent and concluded that data controllers using RFIDs should
check the data protection principles and comply with them.
Highlighting the importance of checking the processing of the data
gathered with the RFID, the purpose principle, and the data quality
principle,35 WP29 continued stating that consent was the legal ground
to carry out such kind of processing of personal data.36 If consent is
necessary, consent must be informed and as such information
requirements must be met (i.e. the customer must be aware of the
presence of an RFID tag on the product bought and of the entity that
would process the related data and for what purposes).37 The public
consultation highlighted that there was consensus as to the fact that
the RFID’s should embed technical solutions (e.g. privacy enhancing
technology or PET) to allow easy deactivation of the RFIDs by the
retailers at the cash register level (i.e. the cashier should deactivate the
RFID at moment of purchase).38 Needless to say that retailers and
standard bodies for retailers “strongly disagreed” that the cashier
should perform the de-activation of the RFID.39 Also, there was harsh
criticism of WP 105 due to the fact that it did indeed stretch the
notion of personal data in some of its examples,40 as well as the fact
that some of the examples were not taken from real life, but mere
hypotheses.41
WP 115 on location data gathered in performance of value added
services is quite interesting; it is a short document (11 pages, cover

35. Id. at 9 (“Data controllers collecting data in the context of RFID applications must
comply with several data protection principles.”).
36. Id. at 10 (“Under most scenarios where RFID technology is used, consent from the
individuals will be the only legal ground available to data controllers to legitimize the collection
of information through the RFID.”).
37. Id. at 9 (Data controllers “must provide the following information to data subjects:
identify the controller, the purposes of the processing as well as, among others, information on
the recipient of the data and the existence of a right of access.”) (footnote omitted).
38. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 30, at 3 (“As concerns technical
solutions that some consider should be in-built in [sic] RFID applications, respondents agree
about the need for easy deactivation of RFID tags by retailers at the point of sale must be
mandatory.”).
39. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 30.
40. Id. at 3 (“In particular, a number of respondents think that the various hypotheses
described in point 3.3 of the Working Party 29 paper do not entail a processing of personal
data.”).
41. Id. (“A repeated criticism of the paper is that the examples of RFID applications
given in the paper do not represent reality.”).
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and standard openings included) and it really is the first official
document that addresses the world of smartphones, although the title
does not explicitly state so.42 The technologies considered by the
document are: devices used in the transport sector, GPS, credit cards,
and mobile phones.43 The document distinguishes traffic data (data to
locate the user and allow it to call or receive calls, as well as all data
relate to phone calls made) that are considered necessary to supply the
phone services, from location data that “provide key information
about an individual” and have been quickly “viewed as a potential
source of revenue.”44 After having addressed the legal framework
under which these applications had to be evaluated—Directive
95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC45—as well as the issues related
to applicable national law, the WP29 highlighted that in order to
process data other than traffic data, it is necessary to obtain consent,
but only after the user has been duly informed pursuant to Section 6
and Section 9 of the Data Privacy Directive.46 Consent is not required
when traffic data are processed in order to perform the services
offered.47 However, it must be noted that WP 115 is quite fuzzy and
confusing when addressing the issue of consent, in that at the very
outset of addressing the issue of consent, it states that consent is
required when sensitive data are processed.48 Although the statement
in itself is correct,49 the point is that WP 115 does not indicate what
sensitive data could be processed by using location data. But most of
all, after having made such an ominous statement, WP 115 does not
address the issue of whether consent is required when sensitive data
are not being processed. It is therefore a significant disappointment
to read a document from such a prestigious group and find such a
grey area. The result is that the document raises some issues that

42. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31.
43. Id. at 2 (“Generally speaking, there are many ways of locating individuals, primarily
using ‘traces’ left by the use of new technologies: automatic ticket machines in the transport
sector, GPS, bank cards or electronic purses, or, in the case at issue, mobile telephones.”).
44. Id. (“[L]ocation data, insofar as they provide key information about an individual (in
short, who is where), quickly came to be viewed as a potential source of revenue.”).
45. Council Directive, supra note 3.
46. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31, at 4-6.
47. Id. at 6 (“Offering a service that requires the automatic location of an individual . . . is
acceptable provided that users are given full information in advance about the processing of
their location data.”).
48. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 31.
49. Id. at 5 (“In accordance with standard practice for personal data protection when
sensitive data are [sic] processed, European legislation requires prior consent to be obtained for
processing location data other than traffic data.”).
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appear to have little connection with the subject matter; and in doing
so creates other questions and issues that are not addressed.
IV. GEOLOCATION SERVICES OFFERED BY SMARTPHONES
A. The WP29 on Geo-Location Services
More interesting and more to the point is the document adopted
by the WP29 on May 16, 2011, WP 185.50
This document has ups and downs, so to speak. It starts with a
description of the technologies involved (base station data, GPS, and
Wi-Fi).51 The document then, per the standard format used in these
cases, summarizes the legal risks of this technology, stating that geolocation services can help gain “an intimate overview of habits and
patterns of the owner.”52 But most disturbing is when WP 185
(similar to WP 115) again makes the point that such location data may
also include sensitive data.53 The examples made are vague,
amazingly generic, and plainly wrong and misleading. Is the mere
presence of an individual in a hospital a sign of him or her being sick?
Certainly not—one may visit a hospital for a dozen reasons, which
have nothing to do with the health status of the data subject, just as
one may go to a church for the wedding of a friend, without there
being an indication about his or her religious belief.
But let’s leave this example aside for a moment. The WP29
highlights what it believes are the main risks of a given technology or
situation in a section of its published documents titled “privacy risks.”
Let’s then look at what risks are pointed to in WP 185. First, since
mobile phones are constantly linked to an individual (people keep
them in their pocket or in their purse), they allow “provider[s] . . . to
gain an intimate view of habits and patterns of the owner and build
extensive profiles.”54 Second, “[t]he technology of smart mobile
50. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services
on Smart Mobile Devices, 2011 881/11 (WP 185) (EN), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2013).
51. Id. at 4-6.
52. Id. at 7 (After noting that most people are indeed aware that mobile devices contain
extensive intimate information, WP 185 states that “[t]his allows the providers of geolocation
[sic] based services gain an intimate overview of habits and patterns of the owner of such a
device and build extensive profiles.”).
53. Id. (“A behavioural [sic] pattern may also include special categories of data, if it for
example reveal visits to hospitals and religious places, or presence at political demonstrations or
presence at other specific locations revealing data about for example sex life.”).
54. Id.
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devices allows for the constant monitoring of location data” so that
“from a regular travel pattern in the morning, the location of an
employer may be deducted.”55 Third, “the unlimited global access
creates new risks ranging from theft to burglary, to even physical
aggression and stalking.” And finally, a major risk is regarded to be
the so called “function creep, i.e. the fact that based on the availability
of a new type of data, new purposes are being developed that were not
anticipated at the time of the original collection of data.”56
Having stated in this fashion the most significant risks, WP 185
clarifies that the legal framework to look at is the Data Protection
Directive 95/46/CE, but if a telecom operator offers geo-location
services processing base station data, these services are qualified as
public electronic communication services, thereby also falling under
Directive 2002/58/EC of July 12, 2002 (the so-called “e-Privacy
Directive”), later amended in November 2009 by Directive
2009/136/EC.57
On the other hand, companies that provide location services and
applications based on a combination of technologies (e.g. base station,
GPS, and WiFi ) are “information society services,” and as such
outside the application of the e-Privacy Directive.58
Given the number of players in this scenario, WP 185 focuses on
the subject to whom the legislation applies and who, hence, has the
duty to comply with the law. Since location data are a combination of
data collected through Wi-Fi access points, GPS, and base stations,
whoever collects these data processes’ personal data should be
regarded as the controller and, therefore, must comply with the
requirements of the Directives.59 In addition, application providers
that offer applications capable of offering geo-location services are to
be regarded as the controller and, as such, have the duty to comply
with the law.60 Examples of these applications are weather forecast
55. Id.
56. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50. As mentioned above, the
risks are listed in paragraph 3.
57. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:01:en:HTML (last visited
Aug. 25, 2013).
58. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 8 (“[C]ompanies that
provide location services and applications on a combination of base station, GPS and WiFi [sic]
data are information society services. As such they are explicitly excluded from the e-Privacy
directive.”).
59. Id. at 11-12.
60. Id. at 12 (“Such applications can process the location data (and other data) from a
smart mobile device independently from the developer of the operating system and/or the
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applications or applications that offer information on near-by places
of interest, stores, restaurants, etc.
Also the developer of the operating system of a smartphone,
“when it interacts directly with the user and collects personal data
(such as requesting initial registration and or collecting location
information for the purpose of improving services)” can be a
controller of data.61 These controllers are required to use privacy by
design principles to help minimize the possibility of secret
monitoring.62
As far as the legal ground for processing, the WP 185 is quite
sharp—the only ground for a controller to supply a value added
service based on the processing of personal location data
(independently if the controller is a telecom operator, application
provider, or the developer of the operating system) is to seek and
obtain prior consent, which must be informed and specific for all
purposes for which data are being processed.63 The consent is also
needed because when the default setting of the operating system
allows for the transmission of location data, lack of intervention by
the user does not imply consent.64 WP29 warns as to the lack of
transparency that may exist and the lack of consistency with the data
principles,65 specifically, that data can be processed only for the
typical purpose of the application.66 In this respect, the different
controllers “must make sure the owners of the smart devices are
adequately informed about the key elements of the processing in
conformity with Article 10 of the Data Privacy Directive.”67 If the
purposes of the processing change, new information must be given
controllers of the geolocation [sic] infrastructure.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 12 (“As a controller the developer must employ privacy by design principles to
prevent secret monitoring, either by the device itself or by the different applications and
services.”).
63. Id. at 13.
64. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 13 (“[T]echnical capacity
should not be confused with . . . lawfulness.”).
65. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 40 (stating that personal data shall be processed
fairly and lawfully, that personal data can be held for one or more specified lawful purposes, and
that it shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with such purposes).
66. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 15 (“The controller must
make it very clear if his service is limited to providing an answer to the voluntary question
‘Where am I right now?’, or if [his or her] purpose is to create answers to the questions ‘Where
are you, where have you been and where will you be next week?’ In other words, the controller
must pay specific attention to consent for purposes a data subject does not expect, such as for
example profiling and/or behavioural [sic] targeting.”).
67. Id. at 17.
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and new consent sought; in fact, WP 185 suggests that a good practice
may be to ask renewal of consent at periodic intervals.68 Data
subjects must be able to withdraw their consent in an easy fashion,
without negative consequences regarding the use of the device.69
Finally, the controllers must grant access rights to the data subject
who, in principle, should have the capability to find out what location
data have been gathered and the profiles that have been created on the
basis of these data.70 Specific attention must be given by the
controllers to the retention period.71 In this respect, the WP 29 is
quite flexible, making a point and offering a way out to controllers;
far from indicating a maximum retention period, the WP29 simply
suggests that a retention period for the data be established.72 I know
very well that this is a sensitive spot for many operators, but the
whole point is that the law does not impose a given number; it simply
asks that a period be determined. It would be unwise to simply say,
“Oh, well, we need those data forever;” yet, if this is the case, there
must be a bulletproof legal rationale on which to base such a decision.
This legal rationale must always be at the basis of whatever the
decision is as to the period of retention. It may very well be that the
legal rationale is justified by technical reasons (i.e. my system would
simply not work otherwise), but the technical grounds must be sound
and bulletproof.
B. A Recent Approach to Smartphones
As mentioned above, the fourth and last document is very recent
and deals specifically with the privacy implications of apps on smart
devices.73 The document is quite articulate and specifically focuses
its attention on consent, data principles, security of the data,
information, and retention period.74

68. Id. at 15 (“The Working Party recommends that providers of geolocation [sic]
applications or services seek to renew individual consent . . . after an appropriate period of
time.”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17-18.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 50, at 18.
73. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 1 (the format of the
document is the same as per the previous documents: the indication of the data protection risks,
applicable law, legal grounds. In this case the document is quite articulate, in that includes many
other sections that deal with purpose limitation, security, information, the data subject rights and
the retention period, ending with conclusions and recommendation).
74. Id. at 5 (“The opinion focuses on the consent requirement, the principles of purpose
limitation and data minimisation, [sic] the need to take adequate security measures, the
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Initially the document briefly describes some of the main
characteristics of the functioning of smart devices and the fact that
many apps, through the application programming interface (API),
have access to many of the sensors available on the devices and
collect data continuously and perform a significant number of tasks.75
The data collected in this fashion can be a base for additional
processing of personal data.76 The risks are identified first in the
fragmentation of the subjects involved and in the lack of knowledge
of data protection.77 Four more risks are highlighted, such as first, the
lack of transparency—users are unaware of the processing of their
data which is taking place due to the simple fact of having
downloaded an app!78 The other risks include the immediate and
direct consequence of the lack of transparency: the lack of free and
informed consent; poor security measures; and finally, the disregard
of the purpose limitation principle.79 As to the applicable law, the
document is quite clear—since the requirement for an informed
consent applies to services offered in the community, applicable law
is European privacy law.80 The personal data that are processed by
the apps are quite significant and the list is quite impressive: location,
contacts, unique device identifiers, identity of the data subject and of

obligation to correctly inform end users, their rights, reasonable retention periods and
specifically, fair processing of data collected from and about children.”).
75. The WP29 describes the data collection process:
Through the API app developers are able to collect such data continuously,
access and write contact data, send email, SMS or social network messages,
read/modify/delete SD card content, record audio, use the camera and access the
stored pictures, read the phone state and identify, modify the global system
settings and prevent the phone from sleeping.
Id. at 4.
76. Id. at 4 (“These data sources can be further processed, typically to provide a revenue
stream, in a manner which may be unknown or unwanted by the end user.”).
77. Id. at 5 (“App developers unaware of the data protection requirements may create
significant risks to the private life and reputation of users of smart devices.”).
78. Id. at 6 (“The lack of transparency is not limited to free apps or those owned by
inexperienced developers as a recent study reported that just 61.3% of the top 150 apps provided
a privacy policy.”).
79. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 6 (“Personal data
collected by apps may be widely distributed to a number of third parties for undefined or elastic
purposes such as ‘market research’. The same alarming disregard is shown for the principle of
data minimisation [sic].”).
80. Id. at 8 (referring to Direct 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC, as revised by
Directive 2002/58/EC, the WP29 stated, “It is important for app developers to know that both
directives are imperative laws in that the individual’s rights are non-transferable and not subject
to contractual waiver. This means that the applicability of European privacy law cannot be
excluded by a unilateral declaration or contractual agreement.”).
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the phone, credit card and payment data, phone calls, logs, SMS and
instant messaging, browsing history, pictures and videos, biometrics,
email and various types of access credentials.81 The four parties
involved are: the developers of the apps, the developer of the
operating system of the device, the app distributors (app stores) and
the other parties involved in the processing of personal data. In some
cases the app store and the developer of the operating system tend to
coincide. End users may also play a part if they decide to share some
information and data, for instance, to a social network, and thereby
incur duties under data protection law if personal data are involved.82
App developers may outsource some of the processing to third parties
or share the information collected to third parties. In these cases the
mechanism to lawfully do so must be used to comply with the law,
and if third parties are allowed access to data, they have to obtain
consent from the user.83 Operating system developers and device
manufacturers are also controllers for data processed to ensure
smooth running of the device and since they develop the APIs, they
have to apply the “privacy by design”84 concept.85 As for the app
stores, they process payment history for apps and other purchases and
as such require user registration, with all related data.86 Third parties
have two kinds of roles: to execute operations for the app owner, or to
collect information across apps and provide additional services.
Depending on the capacity in which they act, they may be processors
or controllers, and to the extent they have access or store information
on the device, prior consent is required.87 As to the legal ground for
processing, it is obvious that consent is required, and the main issues
here are the transparency of the processing of personal data and the
fact that the data subject must be informed of all processing carried

81. Id. at 8-9.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 10 (“If the third party accesses data stored in the device, the obligation to obtain
informed consent of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive applies.”).
84. Privacy by design is a concept that has been developed by Ann Cavoukian,
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada. The concept is based on a set of
principles which aim at embedding privacy tools in the design and architecture of any given
product, making it easier for users to gain awareness of their choice and protect their rights. For
more information, see PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://www.privacybydesign.ca (last visited Aug.
29, 2013).
85. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 11 (“OS and device
manufacturers . . . have an important responsibility to provide safeguards for the protection of
personal data and privacy of app users.”).
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. Id. at 12-13.
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out; this is necessary so that informed and specific consent is given.
“Implicit” consent may not be allowed and may not constitute a valid
basis for processing.88 Another issue is the practice of tracking users
behavior by advertiser or third parties. The operating systems must
avoid such tracking and avoid circumvention by advertisers.89
Another section of WP 202 deals with the purpose limitation and data
minimization.90 The purposes must be well-defined and consistent
with the functions offered to the user, and the apps have to use only
those data that are strictly necessary to pursue these functions.91
Several suggestions are made to minimize security risks,92 but the key
section is related to the information.93 The natural consequence of all
the issues raised is that adequate information must be given to the
user. Now, what is to be considered “adequate information” in this
context? We have seen that there is potentially more than one
controller94 in any given scenario, and so the identity of the
controllers must be known; the purposes for which the data are
collected must be spelled out clearly, as well as the fact that third
parties may be involved in the processing of the user’s data, and what
role and in which capability they are indeed involved. This obligation
is not merely on the developer of the app, but also on the app store.95
The information may be given at the time the user decides to buy or
download the app at the app store.96 If such identities are not known,

88. Id. at 15 (“simply clicking an “install” button cannot be regarded as valid consent for
the processing of personal data due to the fact that consent cannot be a generally formulated
authorisation [sic].”) .
89. Id. (“The default settings provided by OSs and apps must be such as to avoid any
tracking, to allow users to give specific consent to this type of data processing. These default
settings may not be circumvented by third parties.”).
90. Id. at 17 (Users have to “learn how their data are being used. . . The purposes of the
data processing therefore need to be well-defined and comprehensible for an average user
without expert legal or technical knowledge.”).
91. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 17 (“In order to prevent
unnecessary and potentially unlawful data processing, app developers must carefully consider
which data are strictly necessary to perform the desired functionality.”).
92. Id. at 18-21.
93. Id. at 22-23.
94. See supra p. 78.
95. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 22 (“There is an
important responsibility for the app stores to ensure that this information is available and easily
accessible for each app.”).
96. Id. at 23 (“The essential scope of information about data processing must be available
to the users before app installation, via the app store.”). “As a joint controller with the app
developers with regard to information, app stores must ensure that every app provides the
essential information on personal data processing.” Id.
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there is little possibility for the data subjects to exercise their rights.97
And, again, retention period must be defined. In this document the
WP29 seems to be more restrictive in that it does give some examples
of possible retention periods,98 but I once again underline the fact that
the important factor is not merely the time of retention, but the
establishment of a reasonable period of time. The document’s
conclusions draw some three pages of recommendations;99 it would
be useless to list them all here. The main point is that for the first
time the WP29 has come with a significant document, which has
addressed many of the issues that the previous document had
apparently forgotten or overlooked.
V. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
A. A Glance Into the Future: The Proposed EU Regulation
Approach
From the short summary of the documents published by the
WP29 before WP 202 of February 27, 2017,100 I hope it is clear that
there was little substance and a lot of theory. The WP29 had issued
documents that were very general in their nature and had failed to
address any real issue. Anyone who has bought a smartphone and/or
has downloaded an application, for example, knows that real life is
quite different from what the WP29 had depicted; there is very little
information to data subjects (if any) and disproportionate use of
location data (as I said above,101 why in the world does the “mirror”
app102 or a “translate” app want to use my location data? Why do
they need it? What use are they going to do with it?). Unfortunately,
the marketplace is dominated by US based companies, who leverage
the fact that they are based in the US to avoid any of the duties under
European law.
This is not an advisable course of action to take. If a company
wants to do business in any given part of the world, it cannot avoid
the responsibility and the duties that derive from such a decision. For

97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 25 (The retention period for “data that are used once” per year could be 15
months, while a navigation app could “store only the last 10 recently visited locations.”).
99. Id. at 27-30.
100. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32.
101. See supra p. 68.
102. See supra note 26.
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instance Ferrari, the sport car maker,103 in order to sell its cars around
the world, has to comply with each law of each country it decides to
do business in and so does any other seller of any material goods.
The fact that small (or not so small) companies refuse to adopt a
simple, logical legal standard is certainly not a badge of honor for any
such company. Complying with the law should not be an optional
feature, but a fundamental way of doing business. The last document
from WP29 clearly addresses most of these issues. First of all,
European law applies, which has been clearly stated and is a remark
that many data protection authorities and many local European courts
may decide to apply.104 Second, there is too little transparency with
respect to these applications. The consequence is already apparent—
the proposed draft Regulation on data protection105 addresses many of
the issues highlighted by the WP29. Section 5 of the Regulation has
significantly changed one of the key sections of the data principles:
personal data should be processed “lawfully, fairly and in a
transparent manner in relation to the data subject,”106 which is a
significant change compared to the present wording of the Data
Privacy Directive,107 which states that personal data not be “further
processed in a way incompatible with such purposes.”108 Compared
to the Data Privacy Directive 95/46/EC109 the change is very
significant and speaks loudly to whoever wants to listen. When it
comes to consent, it is up to the controller to prove that the data
subject has expressed his or her consent.110 A new section called
transparency and modalities has been added,111 which did not exist in
the Data Privacy Directive. It requires the controller to provide “any
information relating to the processing of personal data” and that such
information has to be given “in an intelligible form, using clear and

103. FERRARI, www.ferrari.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
104. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32, at 8 (“[T]he applicability of
European privacy law cannot be excluded by a unilateral declaration or contractual
agreement.”).
105. See Draft Proposal, supra note 4.
106. Id. at 43.
107. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 40 (Art. 6, Sec. 1(a) states that data must be
“processed fairly and lawfully.”).
108. Id. (Art. 6, Sec. 1(c) simply states that personal data should be “adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed.”).
109. Council Directive, supra note 2.
110. Draft Proposal, supra note 4, at 45 (“The controller shall bear the burden of proof for
the data subject’s consent to the processing of personal data for specified purposes.”).
111. Id. at 47-48.
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plain language.”112 And finally, the section related to the information
to the data subject has been amended as to include the obligation to
inform the data subject as to “the period for which the personal data
will be stored.”113 Finally, the controller has the duty to inform the
data subject as to any further information necessary to guarantee fair
processing.”114
It is clear that all these changes and new
requirements, in one way or the other, are the consequence of the new
technological scenario and that the issues addressed in WP 202 cannot
be ignored anymore. Of course, we are talking about a draft
legislation, whose approval and implementation is still to come (if at
all, for this matter), and there are a significant number of amendments
proposed and waiting to be discussed and voted on at the European
Parliament. Regardless, these changes are the sign of a clear change
in attitude from European legislators.
B. Recent Cases on Mobility Data
And, indeed, things are starting to change. In Italy, the Data
Protection Authority (Italian DPA) has examined several cases where
the issues are related to geo-location services. Italian Law115 has a
specific procedure, the so-called “prior-checking procedure,”116 which
allows companies to file a request with the Authority to examine and
evaluate certain proposed processing of personal data. The Italian
DPA has the power to examine the cases submitted to its attention, to
decide if the processing falls under the law, if it shows any issue of
any relevance, and, in such a case, either to forbid or to prescribe the
precautions or the measures to adopt.117 In this way any controller
has an official seal on specific processing submitted to the Garante for
prior checking and can negotiate specific instances and measures.118

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Decreto Legislativo, 30 Giugno 2003, in D.Lgs., n. 196 (It.).
Id. § 17.
Id.
Id. The relevant text states:
1. Processing of data other than sensitive and judicial data shall be allowed in
accordance with such measures and precautions as are laid down to safeguard
data subjects, if the processing is likely to present specific risks to data subjects’
fundamental rights and freedoms and [sic] dignity on account of the nature of the
data, the arrangements applying to the processing or the effects the latter may
produce.
2. The measures and precautions referred in paragraph 1 shall be laid down by
the Garante on the basis of the principles set out in this Code within the
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One such case (probably the first one related to mobility data)
regarded the use of GPS and other monitoring devices on buses. The
management of a bus company active in central Italy wanted to
implement a GPS-based system that would have allowed the
possibility to check the location of each bus, as well as provide
information on a number of selected of items. The system would
have provided information as to speed, necessity of maintenance,
degradation of specific parts, etc. It was mainly a safety-oriented
system, which the Italian DPA approved without significant
limitations or requested measures.119 This was the first decision on
such matters,120 and other similar decisions on similar cases have been
subsequently adopted by the Italian DPA.121
In another case, the Italian DPA simply issued a document
stating that the system for which prior checking had been requested
had no implications under the law.122 It was a request filed by the
Alpine Rescue Organisation (Alpine Rescue), an organization which
intervenes in cases of avalanches and the like. The Alpine Rescue
wanted to be able to have access to telephone GPS data, if available,
in case of accidents, such as when GPS would be necessary to rescue
people. In light of the public interest of such operations, the Italian
DPA stated that no consent was needed and that the proposed
processing could be carried out without any issue.123
In the Netherlands, at the end of 2012, an investigation was
completed by the local data protection authority on Tom-Tom, the
maker of navigation systems.124 It appeared that Tom-Tom was
selling or somehow making available to third parties the navigation
data of its users, without giving any notice to the users. The Dutch
Data Protection Authority (Dutch DPA) concluded that Tom-Tom had
not been selling its customer data, but it had violated the local privacy
framework of a check to be performed prior to start [sic] of the processing as also
related to specific categories of data controller or processing, following the
request, if any, submitted by the data controller.
Id.
119. Air
Pullman
S.p.A.,
June
5,
2008
(It.),
available
at
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/export/1672796 (last
visited Aug. 28, 2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. GARANTE PER LA PROTEZIONE DEI DATI PERSONALI, MOUNTAIN RESCUE (2008)
(It.),
available
at
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docwebdisplay/export/1580543 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
123. Id.
124. COLL. BESCHERMING PERSOONSGEGEVENS, supra note 14.
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act, due to the fact that the consent to the processing of data is not
sufficiently specific. The Dutch DPA also concluded that the
communication to third parties did not violate the law, since the data
were given in aggregate form and since all references to individual
persons had been deleted. Nevertheless, Tom-Tom has had to change
its privacy notice.125
The cases indicated above and their very limited number show
that the issues related to mobile technology are still far from being
fully understood. For the operators, this is tantamount to “so far so
good.” But what about the future? Will this attitude remain as it is or
is it bound to change?
Well, first of all, all data protection authorities in Europe know
what is going on and are just waiting for the right case to come along.
A trigger is all it takes to attract the attention of the data protection
authorities around Europe. If one looks at what has happened and is
happening to Google, one can understand many things. Many local
data protection authorities have opened an investigation of the Google
Maps “Street View” feature;126 the application has also caused Google
problems in Europe127 and elsewhere.128
Until recently, data
protection authorities hardly dared to act against Google, even though
it was very clear that many of Google’s practices were not in line with
the law. The present privacy problems of Google are an example of
what happens when the authorities understand the issues and decide to
act.129 And, as most lawyers in this field know, the problems are far
from being over—the WP29 has been delegated by the other
authorities to investigate Google’s new privacy policy, and things
seem to be at a stalemate.130
125.
126.

Id.
Google Streetview Cars Will Have To Be Clearly Marked, GARANTE PER LA
PROTEZIONE
DEI
DATI
PERSONALI
(Oct.
25,
2010),
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1761443.
127. Germany: Google Fined Over Street View Privacy, SKY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2013,
http://news.sky.com/story/1081382/germany-google-fined-over-street-view-privacy.
128. Adi, Robertson, Google Settles Street View Privacy Case with 38 States for $7
Million, THE VERGE, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/12/4094522/googlesettles-street-view-privacy-case-with-states-for-7-million.
129. “Captured” Communications on Wi-Fi Networks: The Italian DPS Requires Google
to Block Data Processing and Reports the Case to Judicial Authorities, GARANTE PER LA
PROTEZIONE
DEI
DATI
PERSONALI,
Sept.
21,
2010,
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1751001.
130. GOOGLE’s New Privacy Policy: CNIL Sends a Detailed Questionnaire to Google,
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND LIBERTIES, Mar. 19, 2012,
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-cnilsends-a-detailed-questionnaire-to-google.
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If and when the data protection authorities will fully open their
eyes on the privacy issues created by mobile technology is hard to
tell, and it clearly may depend on many circumstances; nevertheless,
one cannot help but point out that when the new proposed Regulation
on data protection replaces the old Data Protection Directive, the
scenario shall be quite different. Just one thing as an example may
suffice: violations today are subject to relatively limited fines. While
there are also criminal implications in some member states of the EU
(Member States), no real case has been brought forward against
Google (apart from the Vividown case,131 which ended up with
Google’s officials’ acquittal).132
The proposed Regulation calls for fines up to €1,000,000 or 2%
of the total turnaround of the violating company.133 This starts to be a
significant sum under any standard. In other words, privacy laws
have been around for the better part of the past 18 years and no one
can claim ignorance of the law anymore (assuming that this was a
good defense, in the first place).
VI. CLOUD COMPUTING
The WP29 has analyzed the privacy issues related to cloud
computing134 and, although once again the issues of mobility data are
not expressly mentioned, they are nevertheless examined.135 The
document indicates that personal data are being processed in many
different countries, and some of them may be processed in third
countries outside the EU.136 The WP29 has no doubts as to the
possibility of applying European data privacy law when the controller
is located in one or more Member States.137 As mentioned above,138 I

131. La Corte d’Appello di Milano, 21 dicembre 2012, 8611/2012.
132. Oreste Pollicino, Google Versus Vividown Atto II: Eco le Motivazioni, DIRITTO 24,
Feb.
28,
2013,
http://www.diritto24.ilsole24ore.com/avvocatoAffari/mercatiImpresa/2013/02/google-versusvividown-atto-ii-ecco-le-motivazioni.html.
133. Draft Proposal, supra note 4 at 93.
134. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing,
2012 01037/12 (WP 196) (EN), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2013).
135. Id. at 2 (“[C]loud computing services can trigger a number of data protection risks,
mainly . . . insufficient information with regard to how, where and by whom the data is being
processed/sub-processed.”).
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 7.
138. See discussion supra Part I.C..
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believe that personal data processed by means of cloud computing
techniques fall under the category of mobility data; in this respect WP
204 analyzes the transfer of data to third countries.139 Various
alternatives are examined. First, the possibility that the provider of
cloud services is established in the US and has adhered to the Safe
Harbour Rules.140 Having signed up for the Safe Harbour is not
sufficient; a contract has to be signed detailing duties of both
controller and processor.141 But the processor may be in a third
country which does not provide adequate protection. In this case
standard contractual clauses have to be signed.142 Another alternative
examined is the Binding Corporate Rules (BCR).143 A significant
improvement has occurred recently with the opening of the BCR
procedures for data, which apply to employees as well as
customers.144 BCR are procedures adopted by Member States to
allow mobility of personal data within a company that adopts a code
of conduct, binding on its employees in any country in the world.145
Once the BCR have been adopted, they have to be submitted to a
competent data protection authority in Europe, as defined by WP
195.146 This authority can negotiate on behalf of all the other
authorities and, if necessary, can negotiate (along with two other
authorities) the text of the BCR.147 Once the BCRs are approved,
each individual authority in any given country then authorizes the
transfer of the data within the company, regardless of the country in

139. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 134, at 17.
140. Id.
141. Council Directive, supra note 2, at 43.
142. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 134, at 18.
143. Id. at 19.
144. For more information on Binding Corporate Rules, see Overview on Binding
Corporate
Rules,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/international-transfers/binding-corporate-rules/index_en.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2013).
145. There are over 30 multinational companies (including an international law firm)
whose BCRs have been submitted to local authorities and have been approved. For the full list
see List of Companies for Which the EU BCR Cooperation Procedure is Closed, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/internationaltransfers/binding-corporate-rules/bcr_cooperation/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
146. The WP29 published WP 195 in 2012 with its recommendation on a standard form
for approval of the BCRs. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document
02/2012 Setting Up a Table with the Elements and Principles to be Found in Processor Binding
Corporate Rules, 2012 01037/12 (WP 196) (EN), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp195_en.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2013).
147. Id.
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the world where the data shall be transferred to.148 This is the perfect
procedure to follow in case of cloud computing processing of
personal data. In this respect the issue of “where are my data”
becomes meaningless, since the data can circulate freely within the
organization. There are drawbacks, of course (e.g. the use of
subcontractors can be an issue), but the main advantage is the forum
shopping; a company can choose the lead authority of the country it
prefers and negotiate with it. Adopting a BCR is a much more
powerful and reliable way of transferring data (regardless of the use
of cloud computing), since it is a simplified procedure and the
advantages gained are significant. In addition, I strongly believe that
establishing contact and communication with the local authority,
regardless of the country one operates in, is always positive and gives
added value to any other process related to the evaluation of how
personal data are being processed.149
CONCLUSIONS
Presently, EU data protection legislation does not address mobile
technology as such. There is no definition of what mobility data are,
and none is called for in the draft Regulation presently being debated.
Only the WP29 has examined some aspects of mobility data, but in a
very general fashion150 at the outset and only to analyze the issue in
more detail very recently.151
This unsatisfactory status is reflected in the little attention given
so far to the processing of mobility data by national authorities. This
may not be an issue by itself, but leaves significant questions yet to be
answered.
The main issue is the following: mobility data are regulated by
the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) which is based
mostly on the Strasbourg Convention. The Strasbourg Convention

148. The WP29 has published several documents on BCRs, namely WPs: 74, 107 and 108
between 2003 and 2005; more recently, in 2008, three new documents have been published:
WPs 153, 154 and 155.
Opinions and Recommendations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/index_en.htm#h2-2 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). For a comprehensive listing
of the WP29’s documents see id.
149. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Explanatory Document on the Processor
Binding Corporate Rules, 2013 00658/13 (WP 204) (EN), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp204_en.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 29, 2013).
150. See discussion supra Part III.
151. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 32.
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was signed in 1981, and everyone with some experience in this field
knows that an international treaty of this kind is between 3 to 6 years
in the making. This means that the Strasbourg Convention reflects
the IT world of the mid-seventies when distributed processing, the
first form of networking that developed in contrast to the dominance
of the IBM mainframe architecture, was barely emerging. In few
words, this means that a technology that has emerged and evolved in
the third millennium is subject to a law which is not simply obsolete,
but was conceived in an era when mobile phones, GPS, tablets and
the like simply did not exist. This is what I mean when I say that the
present status is unsatisfactory. Legislators, therefore, have to wake
up quickly and act, if they are serious about protecting the privacy
rights of the citizens.
Having said this, in the wake of the new Regulation, controllers
better clean up their act in this field. Faulty information notices (if
any at all), refusal to answer any questions whatsoever by the part of
the data subject, a general attitude that gives the impression of lack of
care on the themes of privacy is not acceptable and is something that,
under the new Regulation, may be very costly.

